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Abstract
The stable marriage problem and its extensions have been extensively studied, with
much of the work in the literature assuming that agents fully know their own prefer-
ences over alternatives. This assumption however is not always practical (especially in
large markets) and agents usually need to go through some costly deliberation process
in order to learn their preferences. In this paper we assume that such deliberations are
carried out via interviews, where an interview involves a man and a woman, each of
whom learns information about the other as a consequence. If everybody interviews
everyone else, then clearly agents can fully learn their preferences. But interviews are
costly, and we may wish to minimize their use. It is often the case, especially in prac-
tical settings, that due to correlation between agents’ preferences, it is unnecessary
for all potential interviews to be carried out in order to obtain a stable matching.
Thus the problem is to find a good strategy for interviews to be carried out in order
to minimize their use, whilst leading to a stable matching. One way to evaluate the
performance of an interview strategy is to compare it against a na¨ıve algorithm that
conducts all interviews. We argue however that a more meaningful comparison would
be against an optimal offline algorithm that has access to agents’ preference orderings
under complete information. We show that, unless P=NP, no offline algorithm can
compute the optimal interview strategy in polynomial time. If we are additionally
aiming for a particular stable matching (perhaps one with certain desirable proper-
ties), we provide restricted settings under which efficient optimal offline algorithms
exist.
Keywords: Two-sided matching; preferences; interviews
1 Introduction
Two-sided matching markets model many practical settings, such as corporate hiring and
university admission [21, 16]. The classical stable marriage problem is perhaps the most
widely studied matching problem in this class, where participants are partitioned into two
∗This research has been supported by EPSRC grants EP/K01000X/1 and EP/K010042/1. The authors
gratefully acknowledge the support of COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice. The authors
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disjoint sets – men and women – and each participant on one side of the market wishes
to be matched to a candidate from the other side of the market, and has preferences over
potential matches. A matching is called stable if no pair of participants would prefer
to leave their assigned partners to pair with each other. Gale and Shapley’s seminal
paper [4] proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a stable matching. The books
by Knuth [13], Gusfield and Irving [6], Roth and Sotomayor [21], and Manlove [16] provide
excellent introductions and surveys.
A key assumption in much of this literature is that all market participants know their
full preference orderings. The classical Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm [4] and its variants
require participants’ preferences as input. This assumption is reasonable in some settings.
However, as markets grow large (e.g., in the hospital-resident matching market [20, 9] or
college admission market [4, 22]) it quickly becomes impractical for participants to assess
their precise preference rankings. Instead, participants usually start out with some partial
knowledge about their preferences and need to perform some deliberation in order to learn
their precise preference ordering. In this paper we assume that deliberations are carried
out via interviews, where an interview is a unit operation that involves one agent from each
side of the market and is informative to both participants. For example, in the hospital-
resident problem (which models the entry-level labor market in which graduating medical
students, or residents, are seeking to be assigned to hospital posts), hospitals are likely
to be able to identify their “top-tier” residents, “second-tier” residents and so on, and in
order to rank the residents in each tier they need to interview them. An interview between
a hospital h and a resident r yields information about the qualities of each party to the
other. Thus we initially assume that each agent’s preference list is in general expressed
in terms of a partial order, and after an agent has interviewed ℓ members of the opposite
side of the market, he/she has discovered enough information to rank those elements in
strict order.
In order to be able to use the GS algorithm to find a stable matching in this setting,
a na¨ıve solution is for each participant to conduct all potential interviews and fully learn
their preferences. Interviews however are usually costly both in terms of time, mental
energy, and money, therefore we wish to minimize their usage. Indeed, the na¨ıve approach
may impose unnecessary deliberation. For example, in the hospital-resident problem, one
expects some degree of correlation across hospitals in the assessment of the most desirable
residents, and likewise residents are expected to have correlated views (at least to some
extent) on the desirability of hospitals. Therefore, it is expected that more desirable
residents get matched to more desirable hospitals and so on. It is then not hard to
see that it is wasted effort if a top-tier resident is to interview low-tier hospitals, or a
second-tier resident is to interview top-tier hospitals. For a concrete example, consider
a setting with four residents and four hospitals where each hospital can admit (at most)
one resident. Assume that residents r1 and r2 are top-tier residents and r3 and r4 are
second-tier residents. Likewise assume that h1 and h2 are top-tier hospitals and h3 and
h4 are second-tier hospitals. The preference lists of all agents are correlated according
to these hierarchies, although each agent’s individual strict ranking (initially unknown)
within these hierarchies may differ. It is not hard to verify that no matter what the true
(initially unknown) preference orderings of the participants are, under a stable matching
r1 and r2 each gets matched to either h1 or h2, and r3 and r4 each gets matched to either
h3 or h4. Thus an interview between r1 and either h3 or h4 is unnecessary, for example.
Unfortunately, we cannot always avoid unnecessary interviews. For example consider a
setting with two residents and two hospitals, where initially agents have no information on
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their preference orderings and hence cannot compare the two alternatives. W.l.o.g. assume
that h1 interviews both residents and learns that it prefers r1 to r2. If r1 additionally
interviews h2 and learns that he prefers h1 to h2, then a stable matching µ is found after
3 interviews, in which hi is matched to ri (1 ≤ i ≤ 2). Now imagine that r1 instead learns
that he prefers h2 to h1. It is easy to verify that the identity of a stable matching is
not yet revealed and hence more interviews are required. The only remaining interview is
between h2 and r2 after which one can definitely identify a stable matching. If h2 learns
that it prefers r2 to r1 then µ is a stable matching. Assume that r2 also prefers h2 to h1.
In this case the interview between h1 and r1 is unnecessary as the three other interviews
would have provided enough information – that h2 and r2 are each others’ top choice –
for µ to be identified as a stable matching. However, a priori we can not always rule the
interview between h1 and r1 as unnecessary; for example when h2’s top choice is r2 but
r2’s top choice is h1.
Any interviewing strategy leads to refinements of the partial orders contained in the
original problem instance that represented uncertainty over the true preferences. A key
aim could be to carry out sufficient interviews so as to arrive at an instance that admits
a super-stable matching µ. Super-stability will be defined formally in the next section,
but informally it ensures that µ will be stable regardless of how the remaining uncertainty
is resolved. The original instance need not admit a super-stable matching (see [8] for an
example) but we are guaranteed that a super-stable matching is always achievable (e.g.,
by conducting all possible interviews, we will arrive at a strictly-ordered instance, where
super-stability and classical stability become equivalent, and the existence of a stable
matching is assured [4]).
Thus our aim is to find a good strategy that conducts as few interviews as possible
so as to obtain a refined instance that admits a super-stable matching. In general any
such strategy will be an online algorithm, since the next interview to be carried out might
depend on the results of previous ones.
This leads to the question of how to evaluate the performance of any given interview
strategy. One could compare it against the na¨ıve algorithm described above that conducts
all interviews. We argue however, by analogy with online algorithms and their competitive
ratio, that it makes more sense to compare it against an optimal “offline” algorithm.
Here, the optimal offline algorithm has access to agents’ preference orderings under full
information and has to compute the optimal (i.e., minimum) number of interviews required
in order to reach an information state under which it can identify a super-stable matching.
In this paper we show that unless P=NP, no offline algorithm can compute an optimal
interview strategy in polynomial time.
Some stable matchings have desirable properties, and we may be interested in refining
the preferences further so as to obtain such matchings. For example, in the man-optimal
stable matching, each man has the best partner that he could obtain in any stable matching,
whilst the woman-optimal stable matching has a similar optimality property for the women.
As described above, after a certain number of interviews we may reach an instance that
admits a super-stable matching µ. But by carrying out more interviews, some men, for
example, may end up with better partners than they had in µ. This would be the case if
µ is not the man-optimal stable matching in the instance with the strict (true underlying)
preferences.
If we wish to evaluate the performance of an online algorithm that aims for potential
improvements in men’s partners even after a super-stable matching has been identified,
then a suitable offline benchmark for the competitive ratio would be the minimum number
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of interviews required to refine the original instance so as to make a specified matching
super-stable. In this paper we show that, whilst this problem is NP-hard in general, there
are restricted cases that are solvable in polynomial time.
Related work Until very recently, the problem of incremental preference elicitation has
received little attention. Several works in the past few years however have addressed this
problem from different angles [12, 14, 1, 3, 19, 7, 2]. Those closest in spirit to ours are
[1, 19, 2].
In [19] the authors introduced a stable matching model in which participants start
out with incomplete information about their preferences, in the form of partially ordered
sets, and are able to refine their knowledge by performing interviews. They investigated
the problem of minimizing the number of interviews required to find a matching that is
stable w.r.t. the true underlying strict preference ordering and additionally is optimal for
one side of the market. They presented several results among which are the following
two: (i) finding a minimum certificate, that is a set of partial preferences that supports
an optimal (for one side of the market) stable matching is NP-hard, and (ii) in a setting
where participants on one side of the market have the same partially ordered preferences,
an optimal interview policy can be found in polynomial time.
In [1], the authors studied a setting where deliberation is in the form of pairwise com-
parison queries (that is, a query leads to strict order of preference being determined over
two acceptable agents for a given agent). They proposed a method for finding approxi-
mately stable matchings, using minimax regret as a measure, while keeping the number
of required comparisons relatively low. In [2] the authors combined the comparison query
model of [1] with the interview model of [19] and introduced a unified model where both
types of elicitation can take place. They provided an efficient (polynomial-time) scheme
for generating queries and interviews, and examined the effectiveness of their scheme via
empirical evaluation including comparison against the polynomial-time algorithm of [19]
for the restricted setting in which participants on one side of the market have the same
partially ordered preferences.
Our work is also related to the body of literature studying variants of stability defined
in settings where agents’ preferences may include ties. As discussed above, super-stable
matchings are relevant in the context of incomplete preference information, because they
are stable no matter which refinements represent the true (strict) preferences. Polynomial
time algorithms have been proposed for finding a super-stable matching, or reporting that
none exists, in various two-sided matching markets [8, 15, 10, 18].
In the next section we provide definitions of notation and terminology, leading to
formal statements of the problems under consideration in this paper. A roadmap of the
remaining sections is then given at the end of Section 2.
2 Preliminary definitions and results
2.1 SMPI, SMTI, and levels of stability
In an instance of the Stable Marriage problem with Partially ordered preferences and In-
complete lists (SMPI), there are two sets of agents, namely a set of menM = {m1,m2, . . . ,
mn}, and a set of women W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn}. We assume without loss of generality
that |M | = |W | (we can easily reduce the case where the two sets are of different sizes
to our setting). Let [i] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , i}. We use the term agents when making
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statements that apply to both men and women, and the term candidates to refer to agents
on the opposite side of the market to that of an agent under consideration. Each agent a
finds a subset of candidates acceptable – we refer to these as a’s acceptable candidates. An
agent a’s preferences over his/her acceptable candidates need not be strict. That is, given
two candidates, a might not be able to compare them against each other. We denote by
pmi and pwj the partial orders that represent the preferences of mi and wj, respectively.
We let pM,W = (pm1 , . . . , pmn , pw1 , . . . , pwn) and call pM,W a partial preference ordering
profile.
Let I = (M,W, pM,W ) be an instance of SMPI, let a be an agent and let c1 and c2 be
two acceptable candidates for a in I. We say that a strictly prefers c1 to c2 if (c1, c2) ∈ pa,
and we say that a cannot compare c1 and c2 (or that a finds c1 and c2 incomparable) if
(c1, c2) /∈ pa and (c2, c1) /∈ pa. We sometimes use the graph-theoretic representation of pa
where candidates in pa correspond to vertices and there is an arc from a candidate ci to
a candidate cj if and only if (ci, cj) ∈ pa.
An instance I ′ = (M,W, p′M,W ) of SMPI is a refinement of I if for each agent a, any
strict total order that is a linear extension of p′a is also a linear extension of pa. We may
also refer to p′M,W being a refinement of pM,W (or indeed I) using the same definition.
Also we can define p′a being a refinement of pa for some specific agent a similarly.
Observation 1. Given two instances I and I ′ of SMPI, I ′ is a refinement of I if and
only if the following condition holds: for each agent a and every two candidates c1 and c2
acceptable to a, if (c1, c2) ∈ pa then (c1, c2) ∈ p
′
a.
A well studied special case of SMPI is the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and
Incomplete lists (SMTI), in which incomparability is transitive and is interpreted as in-
difference. In SMTI, each agent has a partition of acceptable candidates into indifference
classes or ties such that he or she is indifferent between the candidates in the same in-
difference class, but has a strict preference ordering over the indifference classes. In an
instance of SMTI, let Cat denote the t-th indifference class of agent a, where t ∈ [n]. We
assume that Cat = ∅ implies C
a
t′ = ∅ for all t
′ > t. The Stable Marriage problem with In-
complete lists (SMI) is the special case of SMTI in which each tie is of size one. Similarly
the Stable Marriage problem with Ties (SMT) is the special case of SMTI in which each
man finds each woman acceptable and vice versa.
Given an instance I of SMPI, a matching µ is a pairing of men and women such that
each man is paired with at most one woman and vice versa, and no agent is matched to an
unacceptable partner. If m and w are matched in µ then µ(m) = w and µ(w) = m. We
say that µ(a) = ∅ if a is unmatched under µ. Different levels of stability can be defined in
the context of SMPI [8, 15]. A strong blocking pair is an acceptable (man,woman) pair,
each of whom is unmatched or strictly prefers the other to his/her partner. A weakly stable
matching is a matching with no strong blocking pair. Every instance of SMPI admits a
weakly stable matching [17]. An acceptable (man,woman) pair is a weak blocking pair
if each member of the pair is either unmatched or strictly prefers the other to his/her
partner or cannot compare the other with his/her partner, and one member of the pair
is either unmatched or strictly prefers the other to his/her partner. A strongly stable
matching is a matching with no weak blocking pair. Finally a very weak blocking pair
is an acceptable (man,woman) pair, each of whom is unmatched or strictly prefers to
other to his/her partner or cannot compare the other with his/her partner. A super-stable
matching is a matching with no very weak blocking pair. It can be easily verified that
a matching is super-stable if and only if it is weakly stable w.r.t. all strict total orders
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that are linear extensions of the given partial preference orderings [16, Lemma 3.2.4]. In
instances of SMI, weak stability, strong stability and super-stability are all equivalent to
classical stability.
2.2 Interviews to refine the partial orders
In a given instance I = (M,W, pM,W ) of SMPI in this paper, we assume that pM,W , the
partial preference ordering profile, represents the agents’ initial information state. That
is, agents may not have enough information initially in order to rank their acceptable
candidates in strict order. However in the problem instances that we will later define in
this section, we will assume that each agent a has a strict preference ordering ≻a over his
or her acceptable candidates. This represents the true (and strict) underlying preferences
over a’s acceptable candidates, although crucially, a may not (and in general will not)
initially be aware of the entire ordering. We let ≻M,W= (≻m1 , . . . ,≻mn ,≻w1 , . . . ,≻wn)
and call ≻M,W a strict (true underlying) preference ordering profile. The task of the agents
is to learn enough information about their acceptable candidates in order to refine their
preferences, in a manner consistent with ≻M,W , to obtain an SMPI instance I
′ that admits
a super-stable matching µ (thus µ will be stable with respect to ≻M,W ).
Following the model introduced in [19], we assume that instances can be refined through
interviews. Each interview pairs one man m with one woman w. An interview is informa-
tive to both parties involved. Hence saying “m interviews w” is equivalent to saying “w
interviews m”. When agent a interviews ℓ candidates, this results in a new refined SMPI
instance which is exactly the same as I except that a now has a strict preference ordering
over the ℓ interviewed candidates.
Notice that if an agent interviews only one candidate, no refinement takes place. Note
also that not all refinements of I can be reached by a set of interviews. For example,
suppose that in I we have one man m1 and three women w1, w2, and w3. Suppose m1
finds the three women acceptable and incomparable. Assume that in I ′ man m1 prefers
w1 to both w2 and w3, and cannot compare w2 and w3. It is easy to see that I
′ is a
refinement of I, but no set of interviews can reach I ′: for m1 to learn that he prefers w1
to the other two women he must interview all three women, but then he will have a strict
preference ordering over the three of them.
We say that an SMPI instance I ′ is an interview-compatible refinement of an SMPI
instance I if I ′ can be refined from I using interviews. We now show that interview-
compatible refinements can be recognized easily.
Proposition 2. Let I and I ′ be two instances of SMPI. We can determine in O(n3) time
whether I ′ is an interview-compatible refinement of I.
Proof. To verify whether I ′ is a refinement of I, it is sufficient to check whether the
condition of Observation 1 holds. With a suitable data structure, we can do this in O(n3)
time. For each agent a identify the edges present in p′a that are not in pa, and let S(a)
be the set of candidates in p′a that form an endpoint of at least one such edge. For I
′ to
be an interview-compatible refinement of I, it is necessary and sufficient that, for every a,
S(a) forms a complete subgraph in the undirected graph corresponding to p′a. This can
be tested in O(n3) time overall.
Let I ′ be an SMPI instance that is an interview-compatible refinement of a given
SMPI instance I. We define the cost of I ′ given I to be the minimum number of interviews
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r1 : h1 h2 h1 : r2 r1
r2 : h2 h1 h2 : r2 r1
Figure 1: A stable marriage problem instance.
required to refine I into I ′. The following proposition shows how to compute this cost
efficiently.
Proposition 3. Let I be an SMPI instance and let I ′ be an interview-compatible refine-
ment of I. We can determine in O(n3) time the cost of I ′ given I.
Proof. We identify the set of interviews T that refines I into I ′ as follows. Initially T = ∅.
For each agent a and every two candidates c1 and c2, if a cannot compare c1 and c2 under
I, but prefers one to the other under I ′, a must have interviewed both c1 and c2. Add both
of these interviews to T . Notice that we might have already accounted for one or both of
these interviews. However since T is a set, no interview is going to be included in T more
than once. With a suitable data structure, the aforementioned procedure terminates in
O(n3) time overall, and once it does, |T | denotes the cost of I ′.
2.3 Definition of interview minimizing problems
The motivating problem is as follows: given an instance I = (M,W, pM,W ) of SMPI, find
an interview-compatible refinement I ′ of minimum cost such that I ′ admits a super-stable
matching. Since the result of one interview might influence which interview/s to carry out
next, any strategy for carrying out interviews should be regarded as an online algorithm.
In fact there may be no online algorithm that can guarantee to provide an optimal
solution in all cases. To see this, let us return to the example of Section 1 involving two
residents and two hospitals, and suppose that initially everyone finds the two agents on the
other side of the market acceptable and incomparable. Let the true underlying preferences
be given by Figure 1 (here, preference lists are ordered from left to right in decreasing
order of preference). Any online interviewing strategy must start with one interview in
the absence of any knowledge; w.l.o.g. suppose that the first interview involves r1 and h1.
Then it may be verified that the algorithm is bound to use 3 more interviews before a
super-stable matching can be found. (If one interview does not take place then two agents
on opposite sides of the market cannot compare the two candidates in their preference
list; it then follows that each of the two possible matchings would be blocked according
to super-stability.) On the other hand the interview involving r1 and h1 was unnecessary
and an optimal strategy uses only 3 interviews.
Towards computing bounds for the competitive ratio of an online algorithm, the offline
scenario is of interest, and that is what we consider in what follows. In the offline case,
the mechanism designer is given ≻M,W , the strict (true underlying) preference ordering
profile of the agents, and would like to compute an optimal interviewing schedule, i.e.,
an interview-compatible refinement I ′ of I, such that ≻M,W refines I
′. This is reflected
in the definition of the following problem, named Min-ICR, which is an abbreviation for
“Minimum-cost Interview Compatible Refinement problem”.
Definition 4. An instance of Min-ICR comprises a tuple (I,≻M,W ), where I is an in-
stance of SMPI and ≻M,W is a strict preference ordering profile that refines I. The prob-
lem is to find an interview-compatible refinement I ′ of I such that (i) ≻M,W refines I
′,
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(ii) I ′ admits a super-stable matching, and (iii) I ′ is of minimum cost amongst interview-
compatible refinements that satisfy (i) and (ii).
The decision version of Min-ICR is defined as follows.
Definition 5. An instance of ICR-Dec comprises a tuple (I,≻M,W ,K), where I is an
instance of SMPI, ≻M,W is a strict preference ordering profile that refines I, and K is a
non-negative integer. The problem is to decide whether there exists an interview-compatible
refinement I ′ of I, with cost at most K, such that ≻M,W refines I
′ and I ′ admits a super-
stable matching.
As discussed in Section 1, it is sometimes the case that we aim for a particular matching,
stable under ≻M,W , that has some desirable properties, for example the woman-optimal
stable matching. The offline problem can then be viewed as a restricted variant of Min-
ICR where, in addition to I and ≻M,W , we are also equipped with a matching µ. This is
reflected in the definition of the following problem, named Min-ICR-Exact, which is an
abbreviation for “Minimum-cost Interview Compatible Refinement problem with Exact
matching”.
Definition 6. An instance of Min-ICR-Exact comprises a tuple (I,≻M,W , µ), where I
is an instance of SMPI, ≻M,W is a strict preference ordering profile that refines I, and
µ is a matching that is weakly stable w.r.t. ≻M,W . The problem is to find an interview-
compatible refinement I ′ of I, such that (i) ≻M,W refines I
′, (ii) µ is super-stable in I ′,
and (iii) I ′ is of minimum cost amongst interview-compatible refinements of I that satisfy
(i) and (ii).
The decision version of Min-ICR-Exact, called ICR-Exact-Dec, is then defined
analogously to the way that ICR-Dec was obtained from the definition of Min-ICR.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we first show that
ICR-Dec is NP-complete even under quite restricted settings. The proof is by reduction
from Vertex Cover. We also leverage the same proof to show that ICR-Exact-Dec is
also NP-complete. Then in Section 4 we provide a reverse reduction, from Vertex Cover
to ICR-Exact-Dec, and utilize it to show that Min-ICR-Exact is polynomial-time
solvable for several restricted settings. Some concluding remarks are presented in Section
5.
3 NP-completeness results
We show that ICR-Dec is NP-complete even if I is an instance of SMTI in which each
indifference class is of size at most 3. Further, we prove that ICR-Dec is NP-complete even
for SMT instances, and even if all men are indifferent between all women. We first provide
a lemma that will come in handy in proving our claims; the proof is straightforward, and
is omitted.
Lemma 7. Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph where for each vertex v, deg(v) ≤ 3.
We can direct the edges in E such that for each v, deg+(v) ≤ 2 and deg−(v) ≤ 2.
Unlike many problems that are NP-complete, the membership of ICR-Dec in the class
NP is not trivial. Hence, we provide a proof via the following lemma.
Lemma 8. ICR-Dec is in NP.
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Proof. To prove this, it is sufficient to show that given SMPI instances I and I ′, a strict
preference profile ≻M,W and an integer K, we can decide in polynomial time whether (i)
I ′ is an interview-compatible refinement of I, (ii) I ′ has cost at most K, (iii) ≻M,W refines
I ′, and (iv) I ′ admits a super-stable matching.
Both (i) and (ii) are established by Propositions 2 and 3 respectively. For (iii), it is
straightforward to check in polynomial time whether ≻M,W refines I
′.
Finally to establish (iv), we can use the polynomial time algorithm of [18], SUPER-
SMP, to decide whether I ′ admits a super-stable matching or not.
We show that ICR-Dec is NP-hard by reducing from the decision version of the Vertex
Cover problem (VC). VC is defined as follows: given a graph G = (V,E) and an integer
K, decide whether G admits a vertex cover of size at most K. VC is NP-complete even
if each vertex has degree at most 3 [5]; let VC-3 denote this restriction. We denote by
Min-VC the optimization version of VC, that is the problem of finding a minimum vertex
cover in a given graph G.
Theorem 9. ICR-Dec is NP-complete even for SMTI instances in which each indiffer-
ence class has size at most 3.
Proof. By Lemma 8, ICR-Dec belongs to NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce from VC-
3. Let the undirected simple graph G = (V,E) be given such that deg(v) ≤ 3, ∀v ∈ V .
Let V = {v1, . . . , vn}. Let G
′ = (V,E′) be a digraph where (i) ∀(vi, vj) ∈ E
′, (vi, vj) ∈ E,
(ii) ∀(vi, vj) ∈ E, either (vi, vj) ∈ E
′ or (vj , vi) ∈ E
′ (but not both), and (iii) ∀v ∈ V ,
deg+(v) ≤ 2 and deg−(v) ≤ 2. Note that by Lemma 7 such a graph G′ exists. We create
an instance I = (M,W, pM,W ) of SMTI as follows:
• For each vertex vi ∈ V there is a man mi ∈ M and a woman wi ∈ W . That is
M = {mi|∀vi ∈ V } and W = {wi|∀vi ∈ V }.
• Each manmi finds acceptable wi and all women wj such that (vi, vj) ∈ E
′. Moreover,
each man mi is indifferent between all his acceptable women.
• Each woman wi finds acceptablemi and all menmj such that (vj , vi) ∈ E
′. Moreover,
each woman wi is indifferent between all her acceptable men.
Note that the total length of the men’s preference lists is equal to |E|+ |V |. Also note
that as deg+(v) ≤ 2 and deg−(v) ≤ 2 for all v ∈ V , hence the indifference classes are of
size at most 3. Let ≻M,W be a strict preference ordering under which mi and wi rank each
other at the top of their preference lists. We prove that G has a vertex cover of size at
most K if and only if there exists a refinement I ′ of I, of cost at most K ′ = K + |E|, such
that ≻M,W refines I
′ and I ′ admits a super-stable matching. Notice that ≻M,W admits
only one stable matching, that being µ = {(mi, wi)|∀i}. This implies that I
′ must admit
exactly one super-stable matching, that being µ.
Proof of the only-if direction: Assume that G has a vertex cover C of size k ≤ K.
We show that there is a refinement I ′ of cost k′ = k + |E| ≤ K ′ such that ≻M,W refines
I ′ and µ is super-stable in I ′. We create I ′ as follows. For each vertex vi ∈ C refine I
such that both mi and wi now have strict preferences as in ≻M,W This refinement can of
course be achieved by having both mi and wi interview all candidates in their lists; this
includes an interview between mi and wi. Notice that since interviews are informative
to both parties involved, partial refinements in the preference orderings of those persons
whose corresponding vertices are not in C must have taken place as well. For example,
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consider a case in which vi, vj ∈ C, vk /∈ C, and (vi, vk), (vj , vk) ∈ E
′. Then both mi and
mj interview wk and hence wk must now rank mi and mj in strict order of preferences
as in ≻M,W . An interview is either between same indexed agents, e.g., between mi and
wi, or between agents of different indices, e.g., between mi and wj where i 6= j. We
refer to an interview of the former type as a same-index interview and an interview of the
latter type as a different-index interview. The total number of interviews performed by all
agents is going to be k same-index interview plus a number of different-index interviews.
The number of different-index interviews under any refinement can be at most |E|, and
under our proposed refinement is exactly |E| (since C is a vertex cover). Therefore the
total number of interviews is exactly k + |E|. It remains to show that µ is a super-stable
matching in I ′. We call a (man,woman) pair a fixed pair if they are matched in every
stable matching of every strict order refinement of I ′. We show that (mi, wi) is a fixed
pair for all i ≤ n, hence proving that µ is the only stable matching in every strict order
refinement of I ′ and therefore definitely a super-stable matching in I ′. Take any pair
(mi, wi) such that vi ∈ C. By our construction, mi and wi rank each other at top, so
clearly (mi, wi) is a fixed pair. Now take any pair (mj , wj) such that vj /∈ C. Since vj is
not in the vertex cover, therefore it must be the case that all neighbors of vj are in C.
Thus, for any vk that is a neighbor of vj , it has been already established that (mk, wk)
is a fixed pair. Therefore (mj , wj) is also a fixed pair. Moreover, neither mj nor wj can
form a very weak blocking pair with a person they are not matched to.
Proof of the if direction: Assume that I has a refinement I ′ of cost k′ ≤ K ′ such that
≻M,W refines I
′ and µ is super-stable in I ′. We show that G admits a vertex cover of
size at most k′ − |E| ≤ K. We first show that in order to arrive at I ′, every agent should
have interviewed every candidate s/he finds acceptable and to whom s/he is not matched.
Assume for a contradiction that this is not the case. Take a pair (mi, wj), acceptable to
each other, who have not interviewed. Therefore, under I ′, mi is indifferent between wj
and wi (to whom he is matched in µ), and wj is indifferent between mi and mj (to whom
she is matched in µ). Hence (mi, wj) constitutes a very weak blocking pair in µ under
I ′, a contradiction. We have established so far that every agent must have interviewed
acceptable candidates to whom s/he is not matched, which means that each agent has
interviewed all candidates in his/her list who have a different index from him/her. This
amounts to the total of |E| interviews. The only remaining interviews for which we have
not yet accounted are those corresponding to matched pairs. Let C be a set of vertices
such that vertex vi is in C if and only if mi and wi have interviewed under I
′. Notice that
|C| = k′ − |E|. Take any vj /∈ C. We show that all neighbors of vj are in C, establishing
that C is a vertex cover. Since vj 6∈ C, it follows from the construction of C thatmj and wj
have not interviewed under I ′. Assume for a contradiction that vj has a neighbor, say vk,
who too is not in C. Therefore mk and wk have not interviewed under I
′ either. W.l.o.g.
assume that (vj, vk) ∈ E
′. (A similar argument applies if (vk, vj) ∈ E
′.) Thereforemj and
wk are acceptable to each other. Furthermore, since neither mj nor wk have interviewed
their partners in µ, it is the case that mj is indifferent between wj (his partner in µ)
and wk, and wk is indifferent between mk (her partner in µ) and mj. Therefore (mj , wk)
constitutes a very weak blocking pair in µ under I ′, a contradiction.
We next show that ICR-Dec is also NP-complete under a different restricted setting
by making small alterations to the proof of Theorem 9.
Corollary 10. ICR-Dec is NP-complete even for SMT instances and even if agents on
one side of the market are indifferent between all the candidates.
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Proof. W.l.o.g. assume that all men are indifferent between all women. Modify the re-
duction presented in the proof of Theorem 9 as follows.
• For each vertex vi ∈ V there is a man mi in M and a woman wi in W . That is
M = {mi|∀vi ∈ V } and W = {wi|∀vi ∈ V }.
• Each man mi finds all women acceptable and is indifferent between them.
• Each woman wi finds all men acceptable and has two indifference classes. In the
top indifference class are mi and all men mj such that (vi, vj) ∈ E. In the second
indifference class are all other men.
Note that the total length of the women’s first indifference classes is equal to 2|E|+|V |.
Let ≻M,W be a strict preference ordering under which mi and wi rank each other at the
top of their preference lists. We prove that G has a vertex cover of size at most K if
and only if there exists a refinement I ′ of I, of cost at most K ′ = K + 2|E|, such that
≻M,W refines I
′ and I ′ admits a super-stable matching. Notice that ≻M,W admits only one
stable matching, that being µ = {(mi, wi)|∀i}. This implies that I
′ must admit exactly
one super-stable matching, that being µ. Modify the proof of Theorem 9 as follows.
In the only-if direction: For each vertex vi ∈ C refine I such that mi has a strict
preference ordering, as in ≻mi , over women in {wi}∪ {wj |(vi, vj) ∈ E} and wi has a strict
preference ordering, as in ≻wi , over men in {mi}∪{mj|(vi, vj) ∈ E}. Consequently, for all
vj adjacent to vi, mi prefers wi to wj and likewise wi prefersmi tomj. This refinement can
be achieved by having mi interview wi and all wj such that (vi, vj) ∈ E, and additionally
having wi interview all mj such that (vi, vj) ∈ E. The number of different-index interviews
under any refinement can be at most 2|E|, and under our proposed refinement is exactly
2|E| (since C is a vertex cover). So the total number of interviews is exactly k + 2|E|. It
remains to show that µ is a super-stable matching in I ′. Assume for a contradiction that
there exists a very weak blocking pair (mi, wj).
• If (vi, vj) ∈ E, then vi or vj is in C. If vi ∈ C then mi and wi have interviewed
and therefore wi ≻mi wj . If vj ∈ C then mj and wj have interviewed and therefore
mj ≻wj mi. Both cases imply that (mi, wj) is not a very weak blocking pair, a
contradiction.
• If (vi, vj) /∈ E then mj ≻wj mi, therefore (mi, wj) is not a very weak blocking pair,
a contradiction.
In the if direction: We show that in order to arrive at I ′, every man mi should have
interviewed all women wj such that (vi, vj) ∈ E, and likewise every woman wi should have
interviewed all men mj such that (vi, vj) ∈ E. The proof is similar to that presented in the
proof of Theorem 9. Hence we can conclude that at least 2|E| different-index interviews
must have taken place in the refinement. The rest of the proof is similar to that presented
in the proof of Theorem 9, with the difference that |C| ≤ k′ − 2|E|.
In the proof of Theorem 9, µ is the unique stable matching under ≻M,W . Therefore,
it follows from the proofs of Theorem 9 and Corollary 10 that ICR-Exact-Dec is also
NP-complete for the restrictions stated in those results.
Corollary 11. ICR-Exact-Dec is NP-complete even for SMTI instances, and even
when each indifference class is of size at most 3. ICR-Exact-Dec is also NP-complete
even for SMTI instances and even if agents on one side of the market are indifferent
between all the candidates.
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We remark that Theorem 4.4 of [19] implies that ICR-Exact-Dec is NP-complete
and, likewise, Corollary 11 implies Theorem 4.4 of [19]. However, Corollary 11 is stronger
as it is stated for a more restricted setting.
4 Polynomial-time solvable variants
4.1 Preliminaries
In this section we explore the tractability of Min-ICR-Exact under various restricted
settings. Recall that we have reduced from VC to ICR-Dec and ICR-Exact-Dec in
order to show that these problems are NP-hard. Here we present a reverse reduction, from
ICR-Exact-Dec to VC, that will come in handy in proving our claims.
Let an instance (I,≻M,W , µ) of ICR-Exact-Dec be given. As µ is weakly stable
w.r.t. I, it admits no strong blocking pair. If µ is not super-stable w.r.t. I, then µ must
admit some very weak blocking pairs. We refer to such blocking pairs as potential blocking
pairs. We distinguish between between potential blocking pairs by the degree of choice
one has when attempting to resolve them.
Definition 12 (Potential Blocking Pair (PBP)). Given an ICR-Exact-Dec instance
(I,≻M,W , µ), a pair (m,w) is a potential blocking pair (PBP) if (m,w) is a very weak
blocking pair under I. Each PBP (m,w) belongs to either of the following classes.
• Potential Blocking Pair of Degree 1 (PBP-D1) if either m or w strictly prefers the
other to his or her current partner under ≻M,W .
• Potential Blocking Pair of Degree 2 (PBP-D2) if both m and w strictly prefer their
partners to each other under ≻M,W .
Let I ′ be an interview-compatible refinement of I. We say that a given potential
blocking pair of I, (m,w), is resolved under I ′ if (µ(m), w) ∈ p′m or (µ(w),m) ∈ p
′
w.
If (m,w) is a PBP-D2, then it must be that m and w cannot compare each other
and their current partners under I. Thus in order to resolve (m,w) it is sufficient, and
necessary, that m or w learn his/her true preference ordering over his/her partner and the
other side.
Let (m,w) be a PBP-D1 and assume that m strictly prefers w to µ(m) (the argument
is similar if m ≻w µ(w)). Therefore, w must find m and µ(w) incomparable under I, or
(m,w) either blocks µ or is not a PBP, and µ(w) ≻w m, or (m,w) blocks µ. Furthermore,
in order to resolve this PBP w has to learn that she prefers µ(w) to m.
In what follows we use PBP , PBP1, and PBP2 to refer to the set of potential blocking
pairs, and those of degree 1 and degree 2 respectively.
Proposition 13. Let (I,≻M,W , µ) be an instance of ICR-Exact-Dec and I
′ be an
interview-compatible refinement of I. Then µ is super-stable under I ′ if and only if all
PBPs in I are resolved under I ′.
It is easy to see that for a potential blocking pair (m,w) to be resolved, at least one of
m or w needs to interview both the other side and his or her current partner and conclude
that s/he prefers his or her current partner to the other side. The next proposition then
immediately follows.
12
Proposition 14. Let (I,≻M,W , µ) be an instance of ICR-Exact-Dec and I
′ be an
interview-compatible refinement of I. Then µ is super-stable under I ′ only if, for all
(m,w) ∈ PBP , m and w have interviewed under I ′.
For each agent a ∈M ∪W let PBP1(a) denote the set of candidates c such that either
(a, c) or (c, a) is in PBP1 and a ≻c µ(c).
Lemma 15. Let (I,≻M,W , µ) be an instance of ICR-Exact-Dec and I
′ be an interview-
compatible refinement of I. Then µ is super-stable under I ′ only if a has interviewed
µ(a)under I ′ for all agents a where PBP1(a) 6= ∅.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that there exists an agent a where PBP1(a) 6= ∅ and a
has not interviewed µ(a). Therefore for every c ∈ PBP1(a) it is still the case that a cannot
compare c and µ(a), and c prefers a to µ(c). Hence there exists at least one unresolved
PBP under I ′.
4.2 Reduction from ICR-Exact-Dec to VC
Let (I,≻M,W , µ) be an instance of ICR-Exact-Dec. Let M
′ = {m|PBP1(m) 6= ∅ ∨
PBP1(µ(m)) 6= ∅}. Let G(I, µ) = (V,E) be an undirected graph whose vertices V
correspond to matched pairs (m,µ(m)). Let PBP ′2 = {(m,w)|(m,w) ∈ PBP2,m /∈
M ′, µ(w) /∈M ′}. Let there be an edge between any two vertices (m,µ(m)) and (m′, µ(m′))
if (m,µ(m′)) ∈ PBP ′2 or (m
′, µ(m)) ∈ PBP ′2. Remove any vertex with degree zero. Note
that for any remaining vertex (m,µ(m)) it is the case that m /∈M ′.
Theorem 16. G(I, µ) has a vertex cover of size at most K if and only if there exists a
refinement I ′ of I, of cost at most K ′ = |PBP |+ |M ′|+K, such that ≻m,w refines I
′ and
µ is super-stable in I ′.
Proof. Assume that G(I, µ) has a vertex cover C of size at most K. Let I ′ be a refinement
of I under which the following interviews have taken place.
1. Each pair (m,w) ∈ PBP interview each other – a total of |PBP | interviews.
2. Each m ∈M ′ interviews his partner µ(m) – a total of |M ′| interviews.
3. Each pair (m,µ(m)) ∈ C interview each other – a total of K interviews.
The total number of interviews is then equal to |PBP |+ |M ′|+K. As a result of the above
interviews, each agent a learns his or her strict preference ordering over the interviewed
candidates, as in ≻a. (Recall that the interviews are informative to both sides.) It is
then easy to see that all PBP-D1’s are resolved. It is also straightforward to see that for
a PBP-D2 (m,w), if either m ∈ M ′ or µ(w) ∈ M ′, then (m,w) is resolved under I ′. It
remains to show that the remaining PBP-D2’s, that is those in PBP ′2, are resolved as
well. Let (m,w) be such a PBP-D2. By the construction of G(I, µ), V includes (m,µ(m))
and (µ(w), w) and there is an edge between these two vertices. As C is a vertex cover, at
least one of (m,µ(m)) or (µ(w), w) belongs to C. If (m,µ(m)) ∈ C then, following the
results of the interviews, m prefers µ(m) to w under I ′. (A similar argument holds for w
if (µ(w), w) ∈ C.) Therefore (m,w) is resolved under I ′.
Conversely, assume that I admits an interview-compatible refinement I ′ of size at most
K ′ such that µ is super-stable in I ′. We show that G(I, µ) admits a vertex cover of size at
most K ′ − (|PBP |+ |M ′|). Let C be a set of vertices (m,µ(m)) in V where m and µ(m)
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have interviewed under I ′. Note that as we have removed all vertices of degree zero from
G(I, µ), hence all remaining vertices are adjacent to at least one edge corresponding to a
member of PBP ′2. We show that C is a vertex cover and then prove an upper bound on
the size of C.
C is a vertex cover: Let ((m,µ(m)), (m′, µ(m′))) be any edge in E. By the construc-
tion of G(I, µ), (m,µ(m′)) or (m′, µ(m)) is in PBP ′2. Assume that (m,µ(m
′)) ∈ PBP ′2.
(The argument for the case where (m′, µ(m)) ∈ PBP ′2 is similar.) As (m,µ(m
′)) is resolved
under I ′, either m prefers his partner to µ(m′) under I ′, or µ(m′) prefers her partner to
m under I ′. If the former, then m must have interviewed µ(m) and hence (m,µ(m)) ∈ C,
and if the latter then µ(m′) must have interviewed m′ and thus (m′, µ(m′)) ∈ C . Thus
C is a vertex cover.
C is of size at most K ′ − (|PBP | + |M ′|): We prove this by computing a lower
bound on the number of interviews that do not correspond to a vertex in C. It follows
Proposition 14 that all PBPs must have interviewed, hence a total of |PBP | interviews.
It also follows Lemma 15 that each agent a with PBP1(a) 6= ∅ must have interviewed
his/her partner. Looking at this from men’s perspective, all men m must interview µ(m)
if PBP1(m) 6= ∅ or PBP1(µ(m)) 6= ∅ – hence a total of |M
′| interviews. Recall that
(m,µ(m)) /∈ V if m ∈M ′. Therefore none of the interviews we have accounted for so far,
a total of |PBP |+ |M ′| interviews, correspond to a vertex in C.
Theorem 16 essentially tells us that an instance (I,≻M,W , µ) of Min-ICR-Exact is
polynomial-time solvable ifMin-VC is polynomial-time solvable inG(I, µ). Equipped with
this knowledge, we provide three different restricted settings under which ICR-Exact-
Dec, and hence Min-ICR-Exact, is solvable in polynomial time.
Theorem 17. Min-ICR-Exact is solvable in polynomial time if one side has fully known
strict preference ordering.
Proof. Assume that women have strict preferences and the target matching is µ. Note
that all PBPs must be of degree 1. Therefore G(I, µ) is an empty graph with vertex cover
of size zero. It follows from Proposition 14 and Lemma 15 that Min-ICR has a solution
of size |PBP |+ |M ′|.
Theorem 18. Min-ICR-Exact is solvable in polynomial time under the restriction of
SMTI in which indifference classes are of size at most 2.
Proof. We show that G(I, µ) is a collection of cycles and paths, and hence its minimum
vertex cover can be computed in polynomial time. The size of a minimum vertex cover
for any path or cycle of length ℓ is
⌈
ℓ
2
⌉
.
Take any vertex v1 = (m,µ(m)) in V . Recall that if any vertex v2 = (m
′, µ(m′)) is a
neighbor of v1, then it must be that at least one of (m,µ(m
′)) or (m′, µ(m)) is in PBP ′2.
Note that if (m,µ(m′)) ∈ PBP ′2, then under I man m is indifferent between µ(m) and
µ(m′). Since each indifference class is of size at most 2, at most one such neighbor exists.
Likewise, if (m′, µ(m)) ∈ PBP ′2 then µ(m) is indifferent between m and m
′. However,
since each indifference class is of size at most 2, at most one such neighbor exist. Thus,
each vertex has degree at most 2, hence G(I, µ) is a collection of cycles and paths.
Theorem 19. Min-ICR-Exact is solvable in polynomial time under the restriction of
SMTI in which all men are endowed with the same indifference classes, as well as all
women. That is Cmi = C
m′
i for all m,m
′ ∈ M and all i ∈ [n], and Cwi = C
w′
i for all
w,w′ ∈W and all i ∈ [n].
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Proof. We show that G(I, µ) is a collection of complete graphs, and hence its minimum
vertex cover can be computed in polynomial time, since the size of a minimum vertex
cover for any complete graph Kℓ is equal to ℓ− 1. To prove that G(I, µ) is a collection of
complete graphs, we show that for any three given vertices v1, v2 and v3, if (v1, v2) ∈ E
and (v1, v3) ∈ E then (v2, v3) ∈ E.
Take any three vertices v1 = (m,µ(m)), v2 = (m
′, µ(m′)), and v3 = (m
′′, µ(m′′)). If
(v1, v2) ∈ E then, under I, all men are indifferent between µ(m) and µ(m
′), all women
are indifferent between m and m′, and m,m′ /∈ M ′. If (v1, v3) ∈ E then, under I, all
men are indifferent between µ(m) and µ(m′′), all women are indifferent between m and
m′′, and m′′ /∈ M ′. Therefore, since I is an instance of SMTI, all men are indifferent
between µ(m), µ(m′) and µ(m′′), and all women are indifferent between m, m′, and
m′′. Hence (m′, µ(m′′)) and (m′′, µ(m′)) are PBPs. If (m′, µ(m′′)) is a PBP-D2 then, as
m′,m′′ /∈M ′, (m′, µ(m′′)) ∈ PBP ′2 and therefore (v2, v3) ∈ E. Assume for a contradiction
that (m′, µ(m′′)) is a PBP-D1. Assume that µ(m′′) ≻m′ µ(m
′) (the argument is similar if
m′ ≻µ(m′′) m
′′), implying that PBP1(µ(m
′′)) 6= ∅ and thus m′′ ∈M ′, a contradiction.
Theorem 18 is likely to be of more theoretical interest. For the setting of Theorem
17, we could envisage a hospitals-residents matching problem where residents are ranked
uniformly (i.e., in a ”master list” common to all hospitals [11]) according to some known
objective value (e.g., which may be based on academic merit, as in the UK) and residents
must use interviews in order to determine their true preferences over acceptable hospi-
tals. For the setting of Theorem 19, consider a market with “tiered” preferences, where
everybody agrees who/what belongs to each tier (again the membership of these tiers
could relate to some objective values), but the precise ordering within these tiers could be
subjective, and up to individuals to determine themselves. For example, students may use
national league tables for determining top tier universities, second tier universities and so
on, but students’ precise ranking over the universities in any given tier may vary.
If I is of one of the restricted forms for which Min-ICR-Exact is polynomial time
solvable, then one straightforward approach to solvingMin-ICR is to enumerate all match-
ings that are stable under ≻M,W and then solve Min-ICR-Exact for each of them. This
approach is practical if ≻M,W admits a polynomial number of stable matchings.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have studied the complexity of the offline problem relating to computing
an optimal interview strategy for a stable marriage market where initially participants
have incomplete information, and the aim is to refine the instance using the minimum
number of interviews in order to arrive at a super-stable matching. The main direction
for future work is to investigate the online case, where the true underlying preferences are
not known to the mechanism designer, with respect to measures such as the competitive
ratio. Furthermore, an important question for which we do not know an answer yet is
whether Min-ICR is polynomial-time solvable under some restricted setting. Extending
the known results on interviewing in stable marriage markets to many-to-one markets such
as college admission is another important future direction. It is also interesting to study
online algorithms in a setting where elicitation is taking place via comparison queries. In
this paper we assume that the objective of the mechanism designer is to minimize the
total number of interviews overall. One may however argue that such a strategy may
require one or may agents to conduct most of the interviews while the others do none or
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very little. In the view of fairness and the practicality of such central interview-scheduling
schemes, it is also of utmost importance to study settings in which a fair distribution of
the interviews is also considered.
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